Professor Stephen M. Walt of Harvard University argues that People’s Republic of China (PRC) should more focus on US policy according to a recent article that was published in Foreign Policy.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden are locked in a contest for supremacy. (Source: Pool / Twitter / Screengrab / Asia Times)
Proposed Questions for US-China Policy
Walt worries most about China’s potential economic power, the impact of US efforts to prevent China from acquiring cutting-edge technologies, the success of Xi Jinping’s leadership, the “effectiveness” of other countries attempts to balance China, and the outcome of the Sino-US competition to assemble coalition members. Although I might phrase those crucial issues differently, Walt’s fundamental notion is what drives me. I, therefore, present my own (narrower) list.
- Can one distinguish between regional obligations and influence that both Beijing and Washington would be willing to accept? When it reads “accept,” it signifies that there isn’t a great deal of threat of war anymore. China and the United States have different aspirations for the area, with varied goals, demands for adaptation, unique alliances, and preferred ways to address specific strategic issues. These restrictions may have enough of an impact on the US and PRC governments’ fundamental interests—the ones for which they would go to war—to persuade Beijing and Washington to put aside their differences and allow the deal to operate similarly to the 1814–1914 Concert of Europe.
For instance, would be China’s difficulty to accept the US as the strongest strategic actor in the region and the US government’s steadfast desire to maintain this position. Another example would be Beijing choosing war over tolerating alleged US obstruction if it means enforcing claimed PRC sovereignty over Taiwan or the South China Sea. Depending on the response to this query, the US government will know whether to concentrate its efforts on forging a long-lasting détente with China or on getting ready for a potential war.
- How likely is it that China will rule the Indo-Pacific? This turns Walt’s query about China’s potential economic strength into a more significant query. China is expected to overtake the US as the world’s dominant power, which has fueled Xi’s muscular foreign policy. However, Beijing must lower its regional and global aspirations if China cannot sustain the extraordinarily rapid economic growth it has enjoyed for four decades and escape from the “middle-income trap.” China’s military might and global political influence depend on maintaining high economic growth.
Pushback from the region, which is comparable to Walt’s query about the efficacy of balancing, is at least one additional significant factor that influences the likelihood of China achieving regional domination. The United States would still be the second-largest economy in the world even if China overtook it. The United governments might successfully combat PRC expansionism and intimidation and prevent a Chinese hegemony if it worked with a few equally motivated regional governments.
The most intriguing question, which goes beyond Walt’s argument, is whether there are enough states in the region that could come together to oppose Chinese dominance in the absence of ongoing US leadership. Since the regional states have an interest to let Washington take the lead in dealing with aggressive PRC behavior, this potential isn’t tested as long as the US is still forward deployed in strength.
This question thus leads to the conclusion that China confronts two very significant challenges to gaining regional hegemony with little or no additional US effort. Its own economy might deteriorate to the point that it is unable to support an effort to seize dominance. Alternatively, regional resistance could be strong enough to prevent China from controlling regional affairs, with or without the help of the US.
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Proposed Questions for the Reconciliation of the US-China Policy
- What would a PRC hegemony look like for your country’s interests? If it could, China would eschew the rules and standards that Washington supports in favor of a new one. There would be no longer be any support for a “free and open Indo-Pacific”; instead, there would be respect for PRC “core interests.”
The problem for Americans is as follows. By virtually eliminating the risk of a US-PRC war and by China taking over the responsibility of policing transnational threats like terrorist activity, a regionally dominant China facilitated by a withdrawal of forward-deployed US military forces and abrogation of US alliances might cause a net increase in American security and a reduction of US defense costs, while generally not obstructing US businesses from continuing access to the region. The advantages might be enough to make the US feel better about leaving its partners in the region to live under a Sino-centric system. After all, having allies is a means, not an end, to an end.
On the other hand, Americans might anticipate that a Chinese hegemony would be intolerable because of the continued tense relations between the US and China over other strategic matters and because China would work to alter international agreements that would make the US less safe and prosperous.
- Is it conceivable that China will soon change its current intolerant foreign policy? Under Xi Jinping, the emphasis on cooperation has been lessened and more intimidation has been utilized. But is fostering a perpetually adversarial relationship between China and the US bloc China’s ultimate goal? Xi Jinping has made a lot of enemies and mistakes while in power. There is still a strong desire for a less oppressive government that might pursue an international agenda more in line with Deng Xiaoping’s, despite the fact that there is now not much opposition in China. Or perhaps Xi himself will decide to tone down his own foreign policy as a result of international fallout or as China moves past what ultimately proves to be a transient stage of great power immaturity.
If the nature of China’s external posture is changeable and important foreign relationships may be at least a factor in that change, Washington should consider whether policies designed to address the immediate perceived challenges posed by hostile China support or unintentionally work against the realization of what Americans would consider positive changes in future Chinese foreign policy.
These four questions promote a review of the fundamental assumptions that guide the creation of policy. The importance of the US-China relationship, the global ramifications of the current bilateral crisis, and the fact that each of these questions has plausible competing answers all highlight the necessity for our best collective intellectual effort to prevent the unfavorable outcomes that are all too likely.
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